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I. Introduction 
 
Conflicts across the world, ranging from civil wars to riots, civil protests and industrial disputes, 
have affected millions of people and have resulted in lost opportunities in terms of economic 
growth and human development. All types of conflict entail significant private and social costs. 
Violent conflicts, including civil wars, have been responsible for many deaths and injuries and 
the loss of livelihoods, due to the destruction of markets and private and public property and 
infrastructure, loss of employment and increase in food prices due to the scarcity of goods 
(Stewart, Fitzgerald and Associates [2001], Fearon and Laitin [2003]).  
 
The magnitude of private and social costs of recent conflicts across many developing countries 
has brought the analysis of conflict into the forefront of modern development economics. In 
recent years, a vast literature has theorised, quantified and analysed in detail the economic causes 
of conflict in developing countries and its impact on economic and social development. This 
literature has been dominated by the analysis of large-scale civil wars based on evidence from 
extensive cross-sections of countries across several years. A significant number of these studies 
have focused on the analysis of the determinants of civil wars and their duration and have centred 
around the ‘greed versus grievance’ thesis proposed by Collier [1999] and Collier and Hoeffler 
[2000]. There are, however, very few studies concerned with intra and inter-communal conflicts. 
 
Although civil wars have represented a serious constraint to development in recent decades, 
many developing countries have also been badly affected by intra- and inter-communal internal 
conflicts.
1 These forms of internal civil unrest may not necessarily result in large-scale wars but   3
have still been responsible for the destruction of livelihoods and markets, increases in the risk of 
investment, loss of trust between economic agents and the waste of significant human and 
economic resources (Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan [2004], Boix [1994]). Persistent forms of civil 
unrest may also constitute the preliminary stages of more violent conflicts.  
 
The lack of concern in the development literature with civil unrest and internal forms of socio-
political instability is therefore at odds with the current political need to understand what triggers 
wars and violence, in order to prevent the onset of large-scale conflicts and develop more 
sustainable approaches to human security.  
 
There is also still a widespread tendency in the economics literature to treat conflict episodes as 
external shocks to the normal functioning of the markets (Gintis and Bowles 1982). Although 
some types of conflict may be external to local economic decisions and can thus be modelled as 
exogenous shocks (similarly to illness or weather shocks), many civil conflicts are determined by 
the welfare characteristics of their instigators and must therefore be analysed within an 
endogenous framework.  
 
This paper addresses some of these gaps in the literature. The paper provides an analysis of the 
determinants of civil unrest in developing countries and the relative merits of specific means of 
reducing and/or preventing the onset and the proliferation of civil unrest, taking into account the 
possible endogenous nature of civil unrest. The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides 
a theoretical framework for the analysis of the determinants of civil unrest using a two-period 
recursive model. The model considers the trade-off between the use of two policy measures to   4
reduce the level and intensity of civil conflicts – the use of redistributive policies and the use of 
police. Sections III tests the assumptions of this model based on empirical evidence for a panel of 
14 major Indian states between 1973-74 and 1999-2000. The results show that redistributive 
policies have played an important role in the prevention and reduction of internal unrest in India 
and has been a central factor in preventing smaller-scale conflicts from escalating into violent 
civil wars. The empirical results are robust to changes in model specification and the presence of 
endogenous effects. Section IV examines the welfare impact of civil unrest and shows that 
redistributive policies may not only prevent the onset of conflict, but also result in important 
positive externalities on economic growth and social development. Section V concludes the 
paper. 
 
II. Theoretical framework 
 
In a situation of conflict, governments face the usual ‘stick or carrot’ dilemma. The general 
tendency of governments in economies prone to civil unrest is to resort to the use of police or 
military force to offset upheavals. The use of force may, however, be counterproductive in many 
circumstances. In particular, most populations living in democratic or semi-democratic regimes 
are likely to be subject to a repression threshold beyond which the continued use of coercive 
force may result in resentment and may, therefore, increase the risk of further civil unrest in the 
longer run (Gurr [1970], Hirschman [1981], Gupta [1990], Bourguignon [1999], Boix [2004]). 
 
An alternative option to prevent civil unrest or offset existing conflicts is to resort to social 
policies that allow the transfer resources to relevant population groups. Although some studies   5
have suggested that conflicts are largely associated to economic motivations (the ‘greed’ 
hypothesis) (Collier [1999], Collier and Hoeffler [2000]), several other studies have suggested 
that inequality and persistent poverty amongst certain population groups have been responsible 
for the onset of civil wars, riots, insurrections, other forms of civil upheavals and crime. Olson 
[1963], Sigelman and Simpson [1977], Hardy [1979], Weede [1981, 1987], Muller [1985], Park 
[1986], Muller and Seligson [1987], Midlarsky [1988], Londregan and Poole [1990], Boswell and 
Dixon [1990], Brockett [1992], Binswanger, Deininger and Feder [1993] and Schock [1996] 
show that inequalities in the distribution of various assets (land, income, wealth and so forth) 
have been associated with episodes of socio-political instability in several countries.
2 Perotti 
[1992], Svensson [1993], Keefer and Knack [1995], Alesina and Perotti [1996], Alesina et al. 
[1996] and Perotti [1996] illustrate the impact of income inequality on political instability within 
the endogenous growth literature. Stewart [1998, 2002], Elbadawi [1999], Dollar, Easterly and 
Gatti [2000] have analysed the impact of group inequalities and ethnic divides on civil wars. 
Becker [1967], Ehrlich [1973], Sala-i-Martin [1996], Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza [1998], 
Cruz et al. [1998], IADB [1998] show how socio-economic inequalities have impacted on crime. 
Boix [2004] finds that income inequality is statistically significant in explaining the onset of 
different forms of conflict, ranging from civil wars to guerrilla warfare, revolutions, political 
assassinations and riots. 
 
When internal conflict is caused by inequalities between communal groups and the persistence of 
social divides along economic, social or political outcomes, redistributive policies may become 
an effective form of preventing the occurrence of conflict or a means of diffusing existing 
conflicts. In unstable socio-political environments, redistributive social policies may constitute an   6
important institution for the management of conflict, as they address directly the discontent of 
certain population groups with their economic or social status. Redistributive policies will also 
protect people against losses of incomes and basic capabilities, therefore increasing the potential 
costs of these groups engaging in conflicts. By contributing towards the reduction of socio-
political tensions, redistributive policies may also impact on the welfare of higher income groups 
that get negatively affected by conflict (but that may nonetheless oppose redistribution) (Sala-i-
Martin [1996]). Even if the income and other assets of those groups do not face a direct risk of 
destruction by conflict (because, for instance, they are kept in safe bank accounts abroad), 
conflict may still threaten the social and political power of elites, as well as their personal safety 
and that of their families.
3  
 
In this section, we use a simple two-period recursive model to illustrate this mechanisms. The 
model illustrates the impending dynamic trade-offs faced by governments when conflict is caused 
by persistent inequalities between groups and is used to derive the conditions in which 
redistributive policies will be the optimal instrument for the resolution of socio-political 
conflicts. The model assumes, in the tradition of the literature reviewed above, that inequalities 
between social groups (It) cause social discontent. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume a 
society formed by two groups (the rich and the poor). Choices regarding conflict management 
(i.e. choices about the use of police or the implementation of redistributive programmes) are 
taken by the rich in a two-period (t and  1 − t ) decision process.  
 
The model assumes also the existence of a repression threshold, whereby the excessive use of 
force will cause discontent amongst the population. Pt represents the immediate or short-term   7
effect of the use of police on conflict. This effect is assumed to be negative indicating that the 
immediate use of police will reduce the onset of civil unrest in period t. Pt-1 represents the long-
term effect of continuous use of police on conflict. The existence of a repression threshold is 
incorporated in the positive coefficient of Pt-1. This captures the assumption that, although 
repression may be efficient in decreasing any manifestation of conflict in the short term, it may 




The interplay between inequality, use of police and civil unrest can be represented in a difference 
equation: 
 
(1)  1 1 1 − − − + + − = t t t t t  I  P  P C C θ λ σ , 
 
where the level of conflict in period t is assumed to depend on the level of conflict in the previous 
period, as well as on the use of police.
5 Conflict is also determined by the level of inequality in 
society. In particular, it depends on past levels of inequality, assuming that it will take a while 
before feelings of unfairness result in the breach of social cohesion (Hirschman [1981]).  
 
σ ,  λ  and θ  are coefficients that represent the marginal impacts of each variable on conflict. 
They are set to take values between 0 and 1, inclusive, if we normalise the equation. θ  represents 
the inverse of the level of inequality aversion in society (Atkinson [1970], Hirschman [1981]). 
Values of  θ 1  close to zero indicate a society with a high tolerance for inequality, whilst values 
close to one indicate high levels of inequality aversion. σ  and λ  are fixed coefficients that   8
represent the intertemporal impact of the use of police and military forces on conflict. The 
relative size of these two coefficients can be conveniently used to characterise two types of 
society. If λ  is lower than σ , there will be a decrease in the potential for conflict from one 
period to the next. We define the condition λ σ <  to characterise a low-conflict society. A 
society with high potential for conflict will be represented by λ σ > .  λ  can thus be understood 
as a measure for people’s ‘memory’ on the effects of repression.  
 
Each variable in equation (1) represents a choice process. The decision on the amount of police 
depends on the amount of conflict the rich face and can be represented by  t t  C P α = , where α , 
with 01 ≤≤ α , measures the elasticity of the use of police in response to conflict.  
 
In order to simplify the model, it is assumed that only relative income inequality matters. More 
specifically, conflict in this model is affected by intertemporal differences between changes in 
the income of the rich (∆Y
R) and changes the income of the poor over time. If we make the 
reasonable assumption that the poor do not save from their earned income, and normalise the 
income of the poor by the poverty line, any changes in their income over time will equal the 
amount of income transfers (Tt) in society. In other words,  t
R
t T Y I − ∆ = . This equation defines 
inequality as the difference between maximum and minimum incomes accrued to population 
groups agglomerated, respectively, at the top and bottom of the distribution. This is a crude 
measure of inequality but is useful as an indication of effectively observed level of inequality in 
society.
6  
   9
This definition also establishes implicitly that, by resorting to conflict, the poor do not incur in 
any costs, only benefits in the form of  t T  (Becker [1967], Boix [2004]). Costs can be 
incorporated into the analysis by removing the assumption that changes in the income of the poor 
between two time periods depend only on the amount of transfers. This will, however, complicate 
unnecessarily the intuitive aspects of the analysis without changing the final outcome, other than 
adding further constants to the solution of the difference equation.
7  
 
As with policing, transfers of income from the richer income groups to the poorer members of the 
population depend on the level of conflict observed in society, i.e.  t t C T β = , where β , with 
1 0 ≤ ≤ β , measures the elasticity of the use of redistributive transfers in response to conflict. 
 
The propositions discussed above provide a solution for the difference equation (1). This solution 
is given by the general form  L K J C
t












αλ σ θ β ()
.  J L +  represent the initial level of conflict, whilst 
L represents the amount of conflict that will always persist, even when ( ) 0 →
t K  and σ ,  λ , θ  
and  δ  are fixed. It constitutes thus a dynamic equilibrium or stationary state for  t C .  ( )
t K J  
specifies, for every period of time, the deviation of  t C  from its dynamic equilibrium.  
 
The equation solved above has three regions in its moduli space, corresponding to K >1,  K = 1, 
and  K <1.
8 In the first region, conflict increases. The second region corresponds to a 
discontinuity point. In the third region, conflict decreases (i. e., converges towards its dynamic   10
stable equilibrium, L). This is shown in the figures below. Fig. 1 represents the case of a high 
conflict society, whereas fig. 2 shows the situation in which conflict converges towards its 
minimal (dynamic equilibrium) level.  
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In order to guarantee that the model behaves as in fig. 2, we must have  
 








Condition (2) has important policy implications. The right-hand side of (2) represents the ratio 
between the police and income transfer elasticities, whereas the left-hand side of (2) includes the 
expression for the repression threshold ( ) λ σ − , calibrated by the inequality aversion coefficient.  
 
When faced with a conflictual situation, the rich must decide whether to transfer or not transfer 
some percentage of their income to those worse-off (assumed to be the conflict perpetrators). 
α β  represents the choice mechanisms within the model. In reality, this ratio depends on 
various factors and is affected by political and social institutions, including voting mechanisms   11
and the relative bargaining power between the two groups. We will first consider the case in 
which the rich decide to transfer income to the poor (i. e. β > 0). The impact of the use of 
transfers on conflict will depend in turn on whether we consider a low- or a high-conflict society.  
 
Scenario 1: Positive transfers in low-conflict societies. In a low-conflict society, that is when 
λ σ ≤ ,
9 condition (3) is always true, since all the coefficients take values between 0 and 1, 
inclusive. In this region, it does not matter whether conflict is tackled by using redistributive 
income transfers or policing. This is a situation likely to take place in either a perfect democracy 
or a perfect dictatorship regime. In a perfect democracy, everyone votes over the optimal level of 
taxation (i. e. β). Therefore, the higher the level of inequality, the higher the preference of the 
median-voter for taxation and redistribution will always be at the optimal level (see Persson and 
Tabellini [1991], Alesina and Rodrik [1994]). In a perfect dictatorship, the wealthy are powerful 
enough to exclude the poor from any decision-making process. Since the poor do not participate 
in the decision-making process, no redistribution will take place (Buchanan and Tullock [1962], 
Buchanan [1967]). 
 
Scenario 2: Positive transfers in high-conflict societies. In this case, it matters whether transfers 
are used or not. High conflict societies are generally neither perfect democracies nor perfect 
dictatorship regimes. When λ σ > , the use of police is inefficient. The only way to decrease 
conflict in the long term is to decrease inequality. Because the propensity for conflict is high in 
this society, the rich must take into consideration the fact that the poor have the capacity to 
engage in conflicts and have therefore some bargaining power in the decision-making process. 
There is therefore an interdependency between the welfare functions of the rich and the poor,   12
which results from the fact that by instigating unrest, the poor can influence the income and 
welfare of the rich. This interdependency will result in redistribution (Sen [1997]). The poor will 
demand a certain level of redistribution and the rich must decide on the level of those transfers. 
Condition (3) allows the calculation of the optimal ratio between the use of transfers and police 
that leads to a decrease of conflict in a high conflict society by taking into account the 
relationship between () λ σ −  and θ . The optimal ratio will depend on the aversion to inequality 
coefficient  θ 1 . The closer this coefficient is to one, the larger the reduction in inequality must 
be for conflict to decrease. In order to guarantee decreases in conflict, we must thus have 







βα −> ⇒> ⇔ > . In other 
words, in high-conflict societies, conflict will be reduced iff the transfer elasticity coefficient is 
larger than the police elasticity coefficient. In those circumstances, the poor will realise that their 
income is increasing, inequality is decreasing, and thus have no incentive to resort to further 
conflict. 
 
This condition will also maximise the income of the rich. This happens for three reasons. First, 
the use of force may have a repression effect and therefore the rich need increasing levels of 
police to deal with conflict in the absence of transfers. Second, an increase of transfers in period t 
will decrease inequality, which in turn will have a diminishing effect on conflict. Finally, income 
transfers, by having an indirect decreasing effect on conflict through inequality, will also have an 
increasing effect on 
T Y  because the costs of conflict endured by the rich will decrease. Hence, 
redistributing income from the rich to the poor constitutes, not only an indirect form of reducing 
conflict (by affecting inequality), but also yields a positive externality effect for the richer   13
group’s own income. In an independent study, Ghate, Le and Zak [2003] show similarly that the 
marginal efficiency of the police at reducing socio-political instability and the marginal 
sensitivity of socio-political instability to changes in the income distribution determine the 
country’s growth trajectory in a country characterised by high inequality and political instability. 
 




λσ −< , 
i.e. iff λ σ < . In other words, in the absence of systems of income redistribution, the immediate 
use of police has to be either very large or very efficient. If not, conflict will always increase 
away from its equilibrium state. Here we return to the case of perfect dictatorship regime. 
Whether any given society will be in scenario 1 or 3 will depend on how much repression the 
rich can afford. If the rich have a lot to loose, they will vote for a little redistribution (because 
conflict will impact on their own level of welfare, as discussed above). If the rich do not have a 
lot to loose and can sustain indefinitely high levels of repression, we will have scenario 3. 
Sustainable increases in policing can only be maintained when police is extremely efficient and 
results in net positive impact on economic growth (by maintaining stable socio-political 
environments) (see also Ghate, Le and Zak [2003]). If the cost of police becomes too high, the 
equilibrium will be broken. Sustainable increases in policing also depend on the economy’s 
capacity to attract national and international investment and their endowment in natural resources 
(Ghate, Le and Zak [2003]), as well as on how mobile capital is (and allowing the rich to send 
capital abroad thus avoiding costs of conflict) (Boix [2004]).  
 
III. Empirical analysis 
   14
In this section, we examine the theoretical considerations discussed above using empirical 
evidence for India. India is a very diverse country, both in religious and cultural terms.
10 It is also 
one of the poorest countries in the word (Table I). Social, economic and political diversity have 
posed large pressures on India’s social and political cohesion. Some of those pressures have 
resulted from separatist movements,
11 whereas others have been caused by clashes between 
ethnic and religious groups and different castes, as a response to disparities in the distribution of 
employment conditions, access to land and other assets, use of and access to social services, 
access to institutional power and legal institutions, and so forth, across different population 
groups.
12 Civil unrest in India, measured by levels of rioting,
13 has shown a steady upward trend 
between 1970 and 1999, though variation across states is large (Graph I and Table II).  
 
Despite the upward trend in the number of riots in India since the early 1970s, civil unrest has not 
resulted in major civil wars as in other countries in Africa and South and Central America.
14 
Episodes of civil unrest caused by social and economic divides are, nonetheless, a constant fact in 
many Indian regions and affect millions of people in both rural and urban areas. Remarkably, the 
large existing literature on poverty in India has not considered conflict to be a serious constraint 
to poverty reduction strategies and the elimination of social exclusion amongst certain religious 
groups and marginalised castes.  
 
In this section, we investigate the relationship between civil unrest, redistributive policies and the 
use of police in India using data for a panel of 14 major Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Assam, 
Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, 
Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) between 1973 and 1999.
15 The use of panel data   15
allows us to capture the large heterogeneity between all Indian states in social, cultural, religious, 
economic and even political terms.
16  
 
In empirical terms, the theoretical framework developed in the previous sections entails the 
following hypothesis: (i) civil unrest tends to self-perpetuate across time, i.e. if nothing is done, 
conflict will always increase as a result of previous levels of conflict; (ii) high levels of inequality 
between the rich and the poor lead to social discontent and, eventually, the breakdown of social 
cohesion; (iii) most societies respond to a repression threshold, whereby excessive use of force 
will result in further discontent; (iv) redistributive policies can reduce existing conflicts. These 
hypothesis can be tested using the following panel-data model:  
 
(3)  it t it it t i it N X Y C ε ϕ δ γ β α + + + + + = −1 , 
 
where  i α  represents the state effects,  t β  are the year effects,  1 − it Y  is the vector of lagged 
regressors defined in the model developed in the previous section,  it X  is the vector of 
independent variables that vary across state and time,  t N  is a vector of national-level 
independent variables, invariant across state, and  it ε  is the error term. We have estimated model 
(3) using two different specifications. The first, presented in column (1) of Table IV, includes 
only the independent variables considered in the initial specification of the theoretical model 
discussed in the previous section. The independent variables in this model are the volume of riots 
(per 1000 people), the total number of police and its lagged value (number of civil plus armed 
police per 1000 people) and the lagged level of consumption inequality (measured by the Gini   16
coefficient) in state i in period t. Table III presents basic descriptive statistics for all variables 
used in this section. 
 
Civil unrest may also be affected by a variety of variables not controlled for in column (1) of 
Table IV. We have therefore included further control variables (column 2). These are the lagged 
levels of consumption poverty (measured by the headcount index) and, following the extended 
specification of the theoretical model, the level of redistribution across Indian states, represented 
by the logarithmic function of per capita expenditure on social services at 1980-81 constant 
prices. We have also included lagged values for expenditure on social services in order to allow 
both long- and short-term responses of conflict to the use of redistributive policies as with the use 
of police. In order to control for other determinants of conflict, the model in column (2) includes 
the level of state income (logarithmic function of per capita net state domestic product at 1980-81 
constant prices) and a measure for the level of education in each state (per capita number of 
individuals enrolled in primary and secondary education).
17 In addition, we have incorporated 
two national-level variables. The first is a measure for openness of the Indian economy, given by 
the all-India ratio of imports and exports over national domestic product (per capita at 1980-81 
constant prices). This variable is invariant across the 14 states. The inclusion of this variable was 
motivated by the fact that economic liberalisation - which accelerated in India in the early 
1990s
18 - can be a cause of conflicts as economic reforms may cause some groups to benefit and 
others to become worse-off (Winters [2002]). In order to capture the effects of political 
institutions on conflict (Alesina et al. [1996], Barro [2000]), we have included a second national-
level variable representing the result of national elections. This is a binary variable that takes the   17




Model (3) can be estimated using panel estimation methods. The two standard methods are fixed 
effects and random effects. The fixed effects estimates are calculated by applying ordinary least 
squares to the differences within each state across time. The random effects coefficients are 
obtained from a matrix of weighted averages of the estimates produced by the between and 
within estimators. The random effects is therefore a more efficient estimator since it includes 
information across both the various states and the various time periods. However, the random 
effects estimates are consistent only if the state-specific effects are not correlated with the other 
independent variables. This assumption can be tested using the Breusch-Pagan multiplier test for 
random effects (Breucsh and Pagan [1980]) or the Hausman specification test (Hausman [1978]). 
The results from the Breucsh-Pagan test suggested that we should reject the hypothesis above and 
use the fixed effects estimates. However, the Hausman specification test indicates that there is 
not a systematic difference between the fixed effects and the random effects estimates.
20 Because 
we cannot out rightly reject the hypothesis that the  i α  may be random rather than fixed (i.e. 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables), Table IV presents the estimates for both fixed and 
random effects. All models in the table have been corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the residuals.
21 In order to deal with those statistical problems, the results for the 
fixed-effects models are based on robust standard errors estimated using White’s variance 
estimator and clustered at state level. The random effects model has been estimated using feasible 
generalised least squares (FGLS), which allows for a heteroskedastic error structure and AR(1)-




Hypothesis 1: Self-perpetuation of civil unrest. Fixed- and random-effects estimations for the first 
model specification (columns (1) and (3) in Table IV) are quite similar. In both cases, current 
levels of rioting are positively affected by the extent of rioting in the past, which suggests that 
forms of social and political conflict may tend to self-perpetuate. This effect disappears in 
column (3) but is still present in column (4). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Inequality increases civil unrest. With the exception of the FGLS estimator in 
column (4), we have not found any statistically significant relationship between income 
inequality and the volume of rioting in India. This result is in line with other literature (fir 
instance, Boix [2004]). This result has two possible explanations. On the one hand, it could 
suggest that inequalities play a more relevant role in more violent forms of conflict, as indicated 
by the economic literature on civil wars (Stewart [1998], Boix [2004]). On the other hand, the 
result could be due to the presence of other types of inequality not captured by the consumption 
Ginis. Examples include disparities in employment conditions, such as those that have been in 
the origin of recent Hindu-Muslim conflicts in India in the 1980s and 1990s, differences in the 
access to land and other assets, which have provoked serious separatist conflicts in West Bengal, 
Assam and Bihar, discrepancies in the use of and access to health, education and other social 
services, a significant cause of tensions between higher- and low-caste Hindus, and differences in 
the rights of access to political power and legal institutions, which again has been reflected in 
conflicts between scheduled tribes and other populations and in caste-based conflicts across   19
several Indian states. Theoretically, there is no reason to expect these dimensions of inequality to 
be captured by the consumption Gini (Justino [2004]). Non-monetary welfare attributes are, 
however, notoriously difficult to measure as quantitative continuous non-monetary variables are 
often not available. One way to address the problem is to use proxies that may represent non-
monetary divisions within society. In the case of India, religious diversity is likely to be 
correlated with various dimensions of inequality (Harriss-White [2002]). Based on census data, 
we have calculated the percentage of Hindus in the total population of each Indian state. Because 
this percentage does not vary significantly across the time period of the analysis, we can only 
model the effect of religious diversity within the FGLS framework. The results are given in 
column (5) of Table IV and show a negative and statistically significant coefficient for this 
variable: the larger the majority of Hindus in the total population of each state, the lower the 
volume of rioting. This suggests that more religiously diverse states are more likely to experience 
episodes of civil unrest. Note also that state income appears to have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on rioting in India (in the presence of state and year effects). It is thus possible 
that the inequality effects are being captured by stronger state-level income effects. One 
explanation why higher incomes would lead to increases in civil unrest could lie in the uneven 
way in which the benefits from economic growth get to be distributed across all population 
groups. Civil unrest is also affected positively by poverty (in the fixed effects model). The 
desegregation of the poverty and inequality measures by rural and urban areas (column (6)) 
suggests that the result is driven mostly by rural poverty.
22 
 
Hypothesis 3: Existence of repression threshold. The results in table IV confirm the presence of a 
repression threshold in India. Almost all the models indicate that rioting is affected negatively by   20
the use of police at the time the riot takes place. However, the larger the use of police in the past, 
the larger the likelihood of further rioting in the present. This repression threshold may be 
explained by the heavy-handiness of police intervention at times (Upadhyaya [2002]). We should 
also notice that the absolute value of the coefficient for the use of police (λ ) on conflict (0.052) 
is larger than that of lagged use of police (σ ) (0.039) in the fixed effects model (column (2)), 
though the opposite is true in column (4). The estimates are thus not accurate enough to predict 
the scenario where India may be placed in terms of the theoretical model discussed in the 
previous section. Redistributive policies are, therefore, likely to have an important role to play in 
India. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Redistribution decreases civil unrest. The results show that conflict in India has 
been negatively affected by the level of expenditure on social services. School enrolments, which 
can be seen as a form of distribution of assets (Perotti [1996], Bourguignon [2002]), have a 
similar effect. The public expenditure effect is statistically significant in columns (2), (5) and (6), 
whereas the education effect is statistically significant in columns (4) and (5). The impact of 
lagged social expenditure is also negative across all model estimations but not statistically 
significant.  
 
B. Sensitivity analysis 
 
One obvious extension of the models presented above is to ask whether redistributive policies 
and policing affect not only the levels of conflict but also their evolution across time. We have 
therefore applied the panel data models discussed above to the analysis of the determinants of the   21
growth rates of rioting across the same 14 Indian states (columns (1) and (2) of Table V). The 
growth rates refer to changes in the volume of riots for every of the six time periods being 
considered between 1973 and 2000. In this case, the regression threshold effect is only 
statistically significant in the absence of fixed effects. The results show, however, a very strong 
association between public expenditure on social services and the growth rates of rioting in India: 
levels of current and lagged expenditure have a comfortable statistically significant negative 
impact on the onset of civil unrest in India. This result is independent of the estimation technique 
used. Increases in civil unrest in India are further associated with increases in state income 
(perhaps explained by unevenness in the distribution of state income) and increases in poverty. 
This latter effect is not, however, robust to the inclusion of state effects (column (2)). As before, 
states that are more religiously homogenous are associated with decreases in the growth rates of 
civil unrest. 
 
A final question we have addressed is whether our theoretical and empirical frameworks can be 
used to analyse other forms of political instability. One example is industrial disputes. We have 
gathered data on the volume of strikes and lockouts per 1000 people across the same 14 Indian 
states for the same six time periods. The results for this analysis are given in columns (3) and (6) 
of Table V. Although the volume of strikes and lockouts in India does not seem to be associated 
with either the use of police or redistributive policies, the relationship between these two 
variables comes into play when we model changes in strikes and lockouts between each time 
period (columns (5) and (6)). These estimates show that the use of police has, as expected, a 
negative impact on the onset of strikes and lockouts. They do not, however, support the 
repression threshold hypothesis. This result is understandable given that the onset of strikes and   22
riots will be likely to have different motivations. Whereas feelings of repression may provide 
strong motives for individuals to engage in riots, strikes will be specific to labour market 
decisions. The police is also less likely to resort to more aggressive methods of crowd 
management in strikes than in riot situations. Increases in strikes are nonetheless related to higher 
levels of poverty. They also respond to public expenditure on social services which, as with riots, 




The evidence presented so far has not addressed concerns over potential endogeneity problems in 
both the fixed effects and the random effects estimators. Model (3) contains at least one lagged 
endogenous variable – the lagged volume of riots. Even if this variable is not correlated with  it ε , 
because  t is finite, neither the fixed effects or the random effects models will be consistent 
(Wooldridge [2002]). Another possible source of endogeneity results from the theoretical 
framework of section 3. That framework implied that conflict, income transfers and use of police 
are determined simultaneously within the decision process of the rich. This means that the 
models estimated in Table IV may be inconsistent as the right-hand side regressors may be 
correlated with the disturbance term.  
 
Arellano and Bond [1991] have suggested an estimation method to correct for the bias introduced 
in the model by the presence of the lagged endogenous variable. This method allows also for the 
endogeneity in the other regressors. Arellano and Bond [1991] derive a generalised method of 
moments (GMM) estimator that uses the first differences of all variables (thus removing the state   23
specific effects) and lags of all variables as instruments. This estimator is consistent and efficient 
as long as the  it X  variables are predetermined by at least one period, and there is no second-
order autocorrelation in the first-difference of the residuals. This GMM procedure is thus quite 
useful to estimate a dynamic panel where the regressors may be correlated with the error term 
due to the inclusion of lagged endogenous regressors, or due to unknown endogeneity in the 
other regressors.  
 
Due to the theoretical specification developed in the previous section, we can also address the 
possible existence of endogeneity in the model by estimating simultaneously a system of three 
equations – where rioting, expenditure on social services and use of police are the dependent 
variables – using traditional instrumental variable techniques. Baltagi [1995], chapter 7, has 
adapted standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedures to panel data. Baltagi’s method 
allows the estimation of a single equation (model (3)) from a system of equations whose 
functional form does not need to be estimated, though a minimum of two instruments for the 
other two endogenous variables must be provided, including the level of rioting itself. All 
exogenous variables in the first equation are taken to be additional instruments in the first-stage 
estimation of the social expenditure and police equations. We had nonetheless to look for two 
further instrumental variables. The two most promising candidates were the membership of 
labour unions and the number of people in live register. Labour unions have played an important 
role in the establishment of welfare policies in India (Justino [2003]). At the same time, 
expenditure on social services takes into account the number of people in live register in each 
state, as unemployment benefits constitute one the largest expenditure items. We do not expect   24
these variables to affect the number of police in India,
23 which is expected to depend mostly on 
the volume of civil unrest plus all other exogenous variables from the first equation. 
 
The results for both the GMM model and the simultaneous equation models are presented in table 
VI.
24 The new estimates emphasise further the role of redistributive policies in the evolution of 
rioting in India. In column (1), both lagged and current expenditure on social services have a 
negative impact on the volume of riots. Interestingly, these coefficients are not statistically 
significant in explaining increases in rioting (column (2)), which seems to suggest that the 
previous results were driven by the presence of endogeneity in the model. These conclusions are 
replicated in columns (3) to (6), though lagged values of social expenditure have a negative and 
statistically significant impact on the growth rate of riots in columns (5) and (6). We must not, 
however, forget that the 2SLS estimators address endogeneity in the predetermined regressors but 
not necessarily correct for the presence of lagged endogenous variables. 
 
As before, both the volume and growth in riots are driven by larger levels of poverty and state 
income. We obtain for the first time a statistically significant coefficient for inequality in column 
(2), indicating that higher levels of consumption inequality are associated with increases in 
conflict. They do not, however, seem to be associated with levels of civil unrest. The repression 
threshold is still present in column (1) (though not statistically significant) but disappears in 
column (2), where the lagged value for use of police become for the first time negative and 
statistically significant. The repression threshold is nonetheless present in the 2SLS models 
(columns (3) to (6)), suggesting that this effect is likely to impact on the level of conflict but not 
necessarily on the rate at which conflict may change from one period to the other.    25
 
IV. Welfare impact of civil unrest 
 
Violent conflicts are generally assumed to be bad for economic growth and social welfare. 
Conflicts often injure people, destroy markets and livelihoods and affect the establishment of 
trust between agents. However, thousands of individuals every year engage in conflict and are 
responsible for the onset of violence and instability. This suggests that some population groups 
may gains from conflict, either in terms of rent-seeking greed (Collier and Hoeffler [2000]), or in 
the enforcement of policies re-addressing initial unfair situations. In this sense, individuals use 
their engagement in various forms of civil unrest as a form of voicing their demands. This 
engagement can also been seen as a way of re-balancing opportunities, whereby the poor attempt 
to capture rents that are ordinarily better captured by the rich. The participation of the poor in the 
process of development has been viewed by many as an essential part of successful development 
strategies (Ahmad et al. [1991], Drèze et al. [1995], World Bank [2001]. Participation in social 
and political decisions provides individuals with a sense of value and identity and is an important 
means to voice the needs of vulnerable population groups. Politically motivated riots have been 
associated with both gains and losses in terms of social welfare amongst traditionally vulnerable 
population groups, as well as the whole population in India, and elsewhere, as they may influence 
both national and local job practices undertaken by public and private enterprises and lobby for 
the interests of otherwise disadvantaged groups in the design of national policies (Park [1991], 
Standing [1992], Justino [2003]). Such actions may provide strong incentives for the 
implementation of social policies and increased redistribution of incomes and social and political 
rights. On the other hand, civil unrest may also cause social and political uncertainty and,   26
consequently, increase the risk of investment and reduce economic growth. When associated with 
organized labor movements, collective action may also promote forms of wage monopolism, 
create inefficiencies, reduce labor productivity and again hamper economic growth (Freeman and 
Medoff [1984], Standing [1992]). However, if those actions result in higher incomes for a 
significant number of disadvantaged individuals, they may eventually be reflected in increases in 
aggregate national income.  
 
We have analysed the impact of riots on various welfare variables collected across 14 major 
Indian states for the period between 1973 and 2000. The independent variables collected were the 
growth rate of state income (defined as above) and of real per capita rural and urban real 
consumption expenditure, and the levels of rural and urban poverty and inequality. We have used 
Arellano and Bond [1991] GMM technique to estimate the various models, where welfare, civil 
unrest and redistributive policies are assumed to be endogenous. This assumptions is in line with 
theoretical work by Alesina et al [1996] and empirical work for India discussed in Justino 
[2003a, 2003b].  
 
Table VII presents the results for this analysis. The riot coefficient is statistically significant only 
in columns (1) and (6). However, the results tell a compelling story. Contrary to initial 
expectations, civil unrest in India appears to be associated with increases in state income, at the 
same time that it is associated with decreases in rural poverty. Riots in India, at least in rural 
areas, seem therefore to be associated with gains in terms of social welfare amongst people at the 
bottom of the income distribution. These results are slightly at odds with some of the evidence on 
the motivation for riots in India. In a large part of these riots, excluded castes and non-Hindu   27
minorities have often been the victims of riots, rather than the perpetrators. There has been some 
recent cases of groups of minorities protesting against social, political and economic exclusion 
and human rights violations by higher-caste individuals and the police (Human Rights Watch, 
1999). Other types of riots have been motivated by driven by protests against unfair employment 
conditions, access to land and other assets, use of and access to health, education and other social 
services and access to political power and legal institutions (Hardgrave [1983], Oberoi [1997], 
Justino [2003]). The results obtain in this section seem to suggest that the Indian rioting data 




The analysis developed in this paper shows conclusive evidence for the importance of 
redistributive policies on India’s socio-political stability. They also show that force is only at best 
a short-term instrument in the fight against civil unrest. In the longer-term, it may in fact make 
things worse. The results show quite irrevocably that redistributive policies have been very 
effective in diffusing conflicts stemming from discontent over poverty and persistent inequality. 
Higher public spending on social services and higher levels of education seem also to have 
contributed towards stronger economic growth in India. The results suggest thus that 
redistributive policies may not only contribute towards the socio-economic protection of the most 
vulnerable groups of the population, but may also generate important effects for the long-term 
economic development of poor economies in terms of the creation of politically stable 
environments.  
   28
The case study of India has several important aspects that may lead to advances in the 
understanding of the nature and effects of conflict on human security and social welfare. This 
case suggests thus important lessons for other countries where social cohesion tends to break 
frequently but large-scale wars may be avoidable. Some countries in Latin America, such as 
Brazil, Mexico and Peru, have shown the combination of high income inequalities (much higher 
than India’s) and high potential for socio-political conflict (see Binswanger, Deininger and Feder 
[1993]), while other countries have shown signs of deterioration of previously successful social 
development policies (for instance, former Soviet Union republics). Increases in redistributive 
policies may have an important role to play in the establishment and/or maintenance of stable 
socio-political environments in those countries. 
 
The implementation of redistributive policies is not, however, a popular policy recommendation 
for developing countries. These countries face, in general, large social, political and economic 
constraints (high tax evasion, political pressure against income transfers exerted by richer classes, 
administrative and managerial inefficiencies, budget limitations and so forth) that difficult the 
implementation of redistributive programmes. Redistributive policies are also seen as distortions 
to those economies since they may result in implicit taxes on investment which, consequently, 
will lower economic growth and further increase poverty and income inequalities (Persson and 
Tabellini [1991], Alesina and Rodrik [1994]). In addition, redistributive policies may be 
constrained by opposition to redistribution by political and social elites or lack of political will 
for redistribution from governments involved in the pursuit of electoral advantages or 
governments that face difficulties in building adequate support coalitions. Redistribution can , 
however, take various forms (Chenery et al. [1974], Killick [2002]), as inequalities do not arise   29
exclusively from disparities in wages and other earnings, but are also determined by the 
opportunities and choices each individual faces and by social structures. Redistribution can mean 
not only redistribution of incomes, wealth and assets, but also the guarantee of equal choices and 
the redistribution of social and political rights by, for instance, implementing universal primary 
and secondary schooling and universal access to primary health care and social security benefits, 
the guarantee equal access to job opportunities by all groups in the population, independently of 
gender, religion or ethnicity, protection of cultural differences and the right to use different 
languages, as well as establishing equal rights of access to economic, social, political and legal 
institutions by all population groups. These are not conventional forms of redistribution, as 
targeted poor households will not necessarily benefit from an increase of disposable income as 
with income transfers. They constitutes, however, forms of redistribution of income from the 
rich, or the whole population, into the accumulation of assets among the poor assets that will 
hopefully allow their recipients to be more productive and less excluded socially (Bourguignon 
[2002]). The Indian analysis suggests that these policies can have an important role to play in the 
prevention of civil conflicts. 
 
These forms of redistribution may face similar difficulties to the redistribution of incomes, 
wealth and assets, both at the economic and political level. The lack of capital and insurance 
markets and the extent of budget restrictions that characterize most developing countries may 
constrain the implementation of efficient redistributive systems and education and health 
programs. In addition, the persistence of traditional labour structures may impede a change in 
social attitudes crucial to the reduction – and elimination – of discrimination and forms of 
segregation, not only in the labour market but in all areas of society. Finally, policies that   30
guarantee more equal opportunities and a more equal distribution of social and political rights are 
also likely to face opposition from established elites as such policies may be perceived as a direct 
challenge to their economic and political influence. The redistribution of financial resources and 
social and political rights require thus political determination on the part of the government, as 
well as the support of elites and a change of social attitudes. It requires also increased demand 
from the general population for redistribution and a more active participation of the civil society 
in holding the various governments to account on all issues related to redistribution.    31
TABLE I: Poverty, Inequality and Redistributive Policies in Selected Countries 
























India  2149 44.2  0.378  3.2  57  0.6 70 
Low and middle income 
countries 
3410 21.6  0.414  4.1  33  1.9 59 
   East Asia & Pacific  3500  15.3  0.442  2.9  22  1.7  35 
   Europe and Central Asia  5580  5.1  0.347  5.1  5  4.0  22 
   Latin America & Caribbean  6280  15.6  0.498  3.6  13  3.3  31 
   Middle-East & North Africa  4600  7.3  0.365  5.2  48  2.4  45 
   South Asia  2030  40.0  0.376  3.1  59  0.8  75 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  1450  46.3  0.455  4.1  49  1.5  92 
High income countries  24430 -  0.311  5.4 0  6.2  6 
Source: World Development Report 2000/2001. 
Notes: Public expenditure on education and health are given as percentage of GNP. Female illiteracy rates are in percentage of 
total population above the age of 15. Infant mortality rates are per 1000 live births. 




























Source: Government of India, National Crime Records Bureau, Crime in India, various issues.  
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TABLE II: Number of Riots in Selected Indian States, 1973-2000 
  1973-94 1977-78  1983 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 
Andhra Pradesh  3124 3925 3649 3836 3224 2842 
Assam  3530 3631 7634 3351 4441 3647 
Bihar  11699 11153 16865 13586 13341 11067 
Gujarat  458 1012 1465  734 2609 2040 
Karnataka  2701 3710 5421 6402 7846 7522 
Kerala  5673 4976 5393 4796 6116 6605 
Madhya Pradesh  2782 3391 5687 2736 3718 3303 
Maharashtra  2063 2194 7422  802 4713 5146 
Orissa  1807 1687 2761 1611 1941 1442 
Punjab  50 37 89  160 12  3 
Rajasthan  5494  7532 11136 10852 17562 16491 
Tamil Nadu  5382 5566 9302 7602 8307 5408 
Uttar Pradesh  13635  12491 9016 9228 9271 6791 
West Bengal  9501 11523 10320  6132  6641  4601 
Average 14 states  4850 5202 6869 5131 6410 5493 
Source: Government of India, National Crime Records Bureau, Crime in India, various issues.  
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TABLE III: Descriptive Statistics 
   Mean  Standard  deviation 
Volume of riots per 1000 people  Overall  0.119  0.088 
 Between    0.081 
 Within    0.039        
Volume of strikes and lockouts per 1000 people  Overall  0.328  0.283 
 Between    0.119 
 Within    0.258        
Total number of police per 1000 people  Overall  1.335  0.438 
 Between    0.369 
 Within    0.253        
Overall Gini coefficient   Overall  29.172  4.098 
 Between    2.923 
 Within    2.960        
Overall headcount index (%)  Overall  38.354  15.618 
 Between    10.751 
 Within    11.632        
Rural inequality   Overall  28.161  4.563 
 Between    2.933 
 Within    3.568        
Urban inequality   Overall  32.310  3.422 
 Between    2.921 
 Within    2.603        
Rural poverty (%)  Overall  38.882  18.044 
 Between    13.005 
 Within    12.909        
Urban poverty (%)  Overall  38.292  13.760 
 Between    9.167 
 Within    10.505        
Log real expenditure on social services per capita  Overall  5.070  3.995 
 Between    3.706 
 Within    1.749        
Log real net state domestic product per capita  Overall  7.481  0.395 
 Between    0.316 
 Within    0.249        
Primary and sec. school enrolments per capita  Overall  0.149  0.053 
 Between    0.022 
 Within    0.048        
Openness measure  Overall  24.248  0.822 
 Between    0.000 
 Within    0.822        
Congress majority  Overall  0.667  0.474 
 Between    0.000 
 Within    0.474        
Hindu majority  Overall  0.792  0.160 
 Between    0.165 
 Within    0.000 
  
TABLE IV: Econometric Results 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Volume riots  Volume riots  Volume riots  Volume riots  Volume riots  Volume riots 
  FE  FE  RE  RE  RE [hindu]  FE [rural/urban] 
Lagged riots  0.380** 0.328  0.916***  0.915***  0.893***  0.328 
  (2.29) (1.65)  (18.32)  (15.69) (14.75)  (1.66) 
Use of police  -0.047 -0.052  -0.047***  -0.048**  -0.060*** -0.051* 
  (1.21) (1.67)  (2.58) (2.45)  (3.09)  (1.77) 
Lagged use of police  0.021 0.039*  0.052***  0.050**  0.045**  0.041* 
  (0.88) (1.87)  (2.59) (2.21)  (2.07)  (1.87) 
Lagged Gini  -0.000 -0.001  0.001  0.002*  0.002   
  (0.12) (0.26)  (1.25) (1.69)  (1.26)   
Lagged headcount   0.003*   -0.000  0.001   
   (2.04)   (0.18)  (1.49)   
Lagged rural Gini           -0.001 
          (0.31) 
Lagged urban Gini          0.001 
          (0.44) 
Lagged rural poverty           0.003** 
          (2.24) 
Lagged urban poverty           0.001 
          (0.30) 
Exp social services   -0.003***   -0.001  -0.002*  -0.004* 
   (4.12)   (0.77)  (1.93)  (1.84) 
Lagged exp social services    -0.114   -0.042 -0.065  -0.107 
   (1.17)   (0.82)  (1.23)  (0.95) 
Natural log state income   0.153*   0.036  0.049  0.148 
   (1.78)   (0.88)  (1.18)  (1.67) 
School enrolments   -0.092   -0.152*  -0.188**  -0.096 
   (0.95)   (1.90)  (2.32)  (0.86) 
Openness measure   0.006   -0.003  0.004  0.006 
   (0.29)   (0.55)  (0.54)  (0.17) 
Congress majority   0.038   -0.003  -0.005  0.034 
   (1.27)   (0.25)  (0.46)  (1.14) 
Hindu majority        -0.090*   
        (1.85)   
Constant  0.068 -0.488  0.001 0.080  0.066  -0.541 
  (0.50) (1.03)  (0.03) (0.50)  (0.40)  (0.71) 
           
Observations  70 70  70 70  70  70 
R-squared  0.885 0.913        0.916 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, statistically significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.   36
TABLE V: Sensitivity Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Growth riots  Growth riots  Volume strikes  Volume strikes  Growth strikes  Growth strikes 
  FE RE FE RE  FE  RE 
Lagged strikes     -0.067  0.377***     
     (0.32)  (4.26)     
Use of police  -1.078 -0.648*** 0.080  0.008  -1.440***  -1.037** 
  (1.73) (4.07)  (0.82) (0.13) (3.24) (2.14) 
Lagged use of police  0.295 0.412**  0.264 -0.027  -0.787**  -0.052 
  (0.78) (2.51)  (1.30) (0.40) (2.28) (0.11) 
Lagged Gini  0.058 0.014  0.006 0.003  -0.036  0.029 
  (1.13) (1.27)  (0.60) (0.55) (0.50) (0.90) 
Lagged headcount  0.013 0.007*  -0.014  0.000  0.073*  0.018* 
  (0.77) (1.87)  (1.35) (0.00) (1.81) (1.77) 
Lagged rural Gini            
           
Lagged urban Gini           
           
Lagged rural poverty            
           
Lagged urban poverty            
           
Exp social services  -0.041** -0.027**  0.008  -0.002  -0.061**  -0.021 
  (2.79) (2.13)  (1.24) (0.56) (2.23) (0.66) 
Lagged exp social services  -2.758** -1.514***  -0.306  -0.181  -1.588*  -3.219*** 
  (2.25) (2.92)  (0.50) (1.00) (0.83) (3.60) 
Natural log state income  1.921* 1.138***  0.450  0.147  4.013  1.321* 
  (1.83) (3.01)  (1.46) (1.01) (1.57) (1.76) 
School enrolments  -0.440 -0.359  0.485  0.233  1.499  2.536 
  (0.22) (0.50)  (0.55) (0.74) (0.49) (1.24) 
Openness measure  0.105 -0.027  -0.403**  -0.113***  0.441  0.933*** 
  (1.21) (0.39)  (2.64) (2.90) (0.61) (4.39) 
Congress majority  0.044 -0.033  -0.103  -0.004  0.648  0.245 
  (0.13) (0.32)  (0.71) (0.10) (0.99) (0.92) 
Hindu majority   -0.920*   -0.023    -0.550 
   (1.73)   (0.16)    (0.43) 
Constant  1.879 3.640**  9.197**  3.078***  -31.293**  -10.476*** 
  (0.28) (2.51)  (2.38) (3.93) (2.45) (3.02) 
           
Observations  70 70  70 70  70  70 
R-squared  0.510   0.679   0.846   
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, statistically significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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TABLE VI: Endogeneity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Volume riots  Growth riots  Volume riots  Volume riots  Growth riots  Growth riots  Growth strikes  Growth strikes 
  GMM  GMM  2SLS FE  2SLS RE  2SLS FE  2SLS RE  GMM  2SLS FE 
Lagged riots/growth  0.865 -0.635***  0.262 0.883***         
  (1.14) (4.32) (0.79) (12.70)         
Lagged strikes/growth        - 0 . 0 6 5    
        ( 0 . 3 8 )    
Use of police  -0.164**  -1.147*  -0.063  -0.078*** -1.103*** -0.869*** -1.508*** -1.459*** 
  (2.15) (1.88) (1.23) (3.65) (3.18) (2.93) (3.31) (2.88) 
Lagged use of police  0.018 -0.956*  0.012 0.063***  0.254 0.587*  -1.148***  -0.817 
  (0.60) (1.87) (0.21) (2.84) (0.63) (1.90) (2.96) (1.36) 
Lagged Gini  -0.002 0.107* 0.000  0.002  0.061 0.020 0.001 -0.033 
  (1.06) (0.79) (0.08) (1.01) (1.53) (0.80) (0.03) (0.58) 
Lagged headcount  0.005*** 0.034*  0.007*  0.001**  0.019 0.013 0.081***  0.078* 
  (3.60) (1.83) (1.88) (2.07) (0.74) (1.37) (2.66) (1.79) 
Exp social services  -0.003* 0.050  -0.038**  -0.004* -0.100 -0.041 0.030  -0.105 
  (1.79) (1.11) (1.97) (1.78) (0.72) (1.16) (0.87) (0.33) 
Lagged exp sservices  -0.122** 0.161  -0.159  -0.146** -2.840** -2.654***  0.160  -1.650 
  (2.05) (0.53) (0.90) (2.00) (2.23) (2.69) (0.21) (0.89) 
State income  0.191*** 2.392**  0.196  0.098*  1.989** 2.074***  2.589  4.064*** 
  (2.90) (2.07) (1.46) (1.71) (2.08) (2.60) (0.40) (2.91) 
School enrolments  -0.143 12.911 0.095  -0.218*  -0.142 -0.584 14.502**  1.722 
  (1.04) (1.43) (0.31) (1.75) (0.07) (0.34) (1.96) (0.53) 
Openness measure  -0.466** (dropped)  0.015  0.014  0.123 0.025 (dropped)  0.455 
  (2.18)   (0.38) (1.19) (0.43) (0.15)   (1.09) 
Congress majority  (dropped) (dropped) 0.029  0.020 0.026 0.228 (dropped)  0.634 
      (0.66) (1.05) (0.08) (0.85)   (1.38) 
Hindu majority    0.000  -0.148**  0.000  -0.988   0.000 
      (.)  (2.10) (.)  (0.93)   (.) 
Constant  0.190** -0.415  -0.645  0.077  1.984  3.567  -0.082  -30.192*** 
  (2.12) (0.92) (0.67) (0.34) (0.29) (1.16) (0.04) (3.02) 
          
Observations  56 56 70 70 70 70 70 70 
R-squared    0.434  0.849  0.427  0.396   0.496 
Note: z-statistics in parenthesis. R-squared refers to within R-squared for fixed effects and overall R-squared for random effects. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, statistically 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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TABLE VII: Welfare Analysis  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Growth state 
income 
Growth rural cons 
expenditure  










  GMM GMM  GMM GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM 
Volume riots  2.778*** -42.353  408.298  -4.094* 3.102 -0.120  2.388 
  (3.38) (0.33)  (1.01)  (1.92) (1.02)  (0.82) (1.13) 
Use of police  0.218**  22.434 14.648 -0.280 0.152  -0.006 0.137 
  (2.54) (1.52)  (0.29)  (1.54) (0.86)  (0.82) (1.02) 
Lagged Gini  0.003  0.774 1.814        
  (1.07) (1.10)  (1.40)         
Lag headcount  -0.011** -0.953**  -2.056         
  (2.29) (2.12)  (1.27)         
Lag rural poverty       0.681    -0.037   
       (1.49)    (0.50)   
Lag urban poverty        -0.400***   -0.275 
        (2.90)   (1.35) 
Lag rural inequality       0.384    -0.326***   
       (0.36)    (3.60)   
Lag urban inequality        0.092   -0.528** 
        (0.21)   (2.49) 
Exp social services  0.011***  0.142 1.323 -0.009  0.004  -0.001  0.011 
  (3.03) (0.17)  (0.57)  (1.17) (0.72)  (0.42) (1.42) 
Lag exp sservices  0.177*** 9.558  -100.090  -0.106  0.137  0.002  0.127 
  (3.36) (0.40)  (1.07)  (0.89) (1.63)  (0.10) (1.40) 
State income       0.213  -0.585  0.032  -0.364 
       (0.59)  (1.00)  (1.06)  (1.37) 
Lagged state income  0.187*     -0.829***  0.254  -0.019 0.200 
  (1.86)     (3.17) (0.63)  (0.54) (1.13) 
Lagged rural consumption   -0.862*        
   (1.76)         
Lagged urban consumption     -1.892       
     (1.27)       
School enrolments  0.152 164.803  34.974  -0.598*  -1.086  -0.037  0.178 
  (0.37) (1.38)  (0.15)  (1.71) (0.35)  (0.67) (1.16) 
Openness measure  0.801*** -0.911  -73.836  -0.378 1.212  -0.018 0.543 
  (3.82) (0.02)  (0.51)  (0.85) (0.72)  (0.29) (1.29) 
Congress majority            
            
Year effects            
State effects            
Constant  -0.264**  12.010 14.499 0.171  -0.546  -0.015  -0.208 
  (2.51) (0.86)  (0.42)  (0.98) (0.73)  (0.62) (1.26) 
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Observations  70  70 70 70  70  70  70 
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1 There were about 4000 political riots across the world between 1919 and 1997 (Boix [2004], based on estimates 
from Banks [1997]). 
2 For a more extensive review see Gupta [1990]. 
3 The introduction of conflict as a constrain to the maximisation of the utility function of the rich introduces an 
externality effect, which results from the interdependency that necessarily arises between the utility function of the 
rich and the utility function of the poor when the conflict variable is taken into consideration. This externality effect 
of redistributive policies is similar to the externality effects of income transfers analysed by Zeckhauser [1991], 
Sala-i-Martin [1994] and Cashin [1995] and manifests itself on an indirect increase of the welfare of the group that 
provides the transfers, whether the transfer is intra-generational (as in Zeckhauser’s work), or intergenerational 
(Sala-i-Martin). 
4 The assumptions that underlie this model will be empirically tested in the next section for the case study of India. 
5 There is a risk that conflicts caused by social discontent are self-perpetuating and thus previous levels of conflict 
will affect positively the level of conflict in the next period. When no other variables are taken into consideration, 
this model assumes that conflict in period t will be exactly the same as conflict in period t-1. In other words, in the 
absence of factors that either contain or encourage conflict, the level of conflict in society will remain constant 
across time. 
6 Boix [2004] uses a similar measure of inequality in an independent study. The empirical analysis to be undertaken 
in section 4 will use more sophisticated measures of inequality. In an analysis of inequality in India, Justino [2001] 
found most indices of inequality to be very highly correlated. 
7 See Boix [2004]. Although his analysis incorporates possible costs of conflict for the perpetrators of conflict in his 






















9 The case λ σ =  is included in this scenario because we assume β ≠ 0. Condition (3) is automatically satisfied for 
λ σ =  and β ≠ 0. 
10 Hindus constitute around 83% of the Indian population. Muslims, India’s largest minority, represent 11% of the 
population. Other minorities include the Sikhs, concentrated in the Punjab (2% of the total Indian population), 
Christians, Buddhists, Parsees and Jews (Hardgrave [1983]). Hindus are, in turn, divided into thousands of castes 
and sub-castes and different languages. There are more than a dozen major languages in India. Hindu, the official 
language, is spoken by a mere 30% of the population (Hardgrave [1983]). 
11 Two of the most serious separatist conflicts have taken place in the northern states of Punjab and Kashmir. The 
ethnic conflict between Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab have led to the death of more than 20000 people since 1981 
(Hardgrave [1993], Jodhka [2001]). The conflict in Kashmir has resulted in two wars between India and Pakistan 
and has led to the death of around 12000 people since 1989. Other separatist conflicts include those fuelled by 
Nepalis, in the late 1980s, in West Bangal, demanding a separate “Gurkhhaland” state. This led to two years of 
violence in which more than 300 people were killed. Demands for a separate state have been recently renewed. The 
Bodo tribals in Assam have also been leading a violent struggle for the creation of a separate Bodoland, whilst 
tribals in the mineral-rich southern Bihar and contiguous districts in neighbouring states have demanded a separate 
Jharkland state. These demands have assumed particular violent forms since the early 1990s (EPW [2001]).  
12 Recent examples include riots across various states between Hindus and Muslims following the destruction of the 
Ayodhya mosque in 1992, violent riots in Gujarat and Maharashtra since the late 1990s, series of ethnic clashes and 
massacres between the Ranvir Sena and Naxalites in Bihar since 1994, violence against Dalits across various states, 
and so forth (Human Rights Watch 1999 2000 2001). Ever increasing linguistic and cultural identities have also led 
to conflicts against outsiders. One of the most violent manifestations of this type of conflict has taken place 
sporadically in Maharashtra, where the Shiv Sena, a regional party, has directed attacks against South Indian 
immigrants and Muslims. In Assam, violence against Bengali immigrants led to the death of about 5000 people 
between 1980 and 1986, whereas violence against Christians is relatively common in the states of Gujarat, 
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh (Human Rights Watch [2000, 2001]).   50
                                                                                                                                                                                            
13 Riots are typically defined as collective acts of spontaneous violence that include five or more people (see Gurr 
[1970]). Riots are classified as violent crimes by the Indian Penal Code, under the category of cognisable crime. This 
data is provided by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). This data may underreport the true extent of riots 
as the police (who records the occurrence of riots) in recent years has not intervened in riots of small-scale and 
duration (B. Narayanan, private communication). The reliability of the data may also depend on the reporting 
accuracy of each state police bureau. This possible data measurement error will, however, be systematic across all 
states and all years and thus unlikely to affect significantly our empirical results.  
14 There have been two wars between India and Pakistan. These did not, however, spread internally across the two 
countries. 
15 We have six data points within that period: 1973-74, 1977-78, 1983, 1987-88, 1993-94 and 1999-2000. These 
dates correspond to the dates of the large sample National Sample Surveys (NSS). The National Sample Survey 
Organisation (NSSO) provides the main source of information on consumption expenditure (and thus poverty and 
inequality) in India. Their surveys were conducted annually until 1972-73 but more or less every five years 
thereafter. Our analysis focuses on these six years in order to ensure consistency across all variables. Although 
periodocity is not constant across all periods, the estimators are efficient and unbiased as the model considers 
observations for each variable in the same time periods (Greene [2000]). 
16 The choice of states for the panel was based on data reliability, which is higher for the larger states. We do not 
expect that the exclusion of smaller states and Union territories to affect significantly our results. In 1999-2000, 
these 14 states represented 93.3% of the total Indian population. 
17 Only the current values of these variables have been included as present enrolment rates reflect already the 
accumulation of this variable across time. The number of people enrolled in primary and secondary school in 1999 
includes the number of these people enrolled in previous years plus additional registrations on that year. 
18 For discussion of the liberalisation process in India after 1990 see Srinivasan [1996] and Srinivasan [2001]. 
19 This variable is published by the Indian Election Commission. 
20 The Breusch-Pagan method tests the null hypothesis that Var(ε )=0. For both specifications of model (3) we 
obtained  75 . 8 ) 1 (
2 = χ  with  0031 . 0 Prob
2 = > χ . The hausman method tests the null hypothesis that the difference 
between the fixed effects and the random effects are not systematic. For both specifications we obtained 
00 . 0 ) 4 (
2 = χ  with  000 . 1 Prob
2 = > χ . 
21 The uncorrected model showed signs of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
22 The aggregated inequality and poverty measures were calculated from rural and urban coefficients weighted by 
rural and urban populations in each state as provided by the Indian Census. The inequality and poverty data is taken 
from Özler, Datt and Ravallion (1996), World Bank for the 1973-94 to 1993-94 periods. The headcount indices for 
1999-2000 are from Deaton (2001b), whereas the 1999-2000 Gini coefficients from National Human Development 
Report 2001, Planning Commission, Government of India. 
23 In the first-stage estimation, these two variables were only statistically significant in the social expenditure model. 
24 The 2SLS results presented are the second-stage results only as we are only interested in estimating model (3). 
The GMM estimator is the more efficient Arellano-Bond two-step estimator given the presence of heteroskedasticity 
we found previously in the model. We have tested the three GMM estimators presented in Table VI using the Sargan 
test for over-identification of restrictions. The results for columns (1), (2) and (7), respectively, were  27 . 1 ) 9 (
2 = χ  
with  9985 . 0 Prob
2 = > χ ,  72 . 0 ) 9 (
2 = χ  with  999 . 0 Prob
2 = > χ  and  47 . 2 ) 9 (
2 = χ  with  982 . 0 Prob
2 = > χ . We 
also rejected the hypotheses of first- and second-order autocorrelation in the three models at less than 5% level of 
significance. 